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Introduction
According to John Stuart Mill, “Neither one person, nor any number of persons, is
warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for
his own benefit what he chooses to do with it” (qtd. Dworkin, “Paternalism” 107). Thus Mill
champions autonomy above all else in self-regarding cases. And indeed, we have come to treat
autonomy as one of our highest values. The value that we confer to autonomy may be traced to
various reasons, among them arguments that respecting others’ autonomous choices is the best
way of securing their welfare, that respecting autonomy creates an environment that promotes
individuality and human flourishing (Arneson 481), and lastly, that autonomy is simply part of
what it means to be a person, and to deny others’ autonomy is to deny them some aspect of
personhood (Dworkin, “Paternalism” 117).
And yet, autonomy is not our only value. In particular, I will consider the competing
value of human welfare and the justifiability of overriding autonomy through paternalistic
interferences. For example, are we justified in forcing a life-saving blood transfusion onto an
unwilling Jehovah’s Witness? On the one hand, the Jehovah’s Witness may be exercising her
autonomy in refusing to accept the blood transfusion, and we typically wish to respect others’
autonomy. Yet at the same time, we may want to override the Jehovah’s Witness’s autonomous
decision on the grounds that her refusal — resulting in death in this case — is bad for her.
In order to lay the groundwork for discussing paternalistic interferences with autonomous
decisions, I first consider different conceptions of autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, and
determine which I mean to use. In particular, I proceed with Dworkin’s characterization of
autonomy as a combination of authenticity and self-determination; Nussbaum’s capabilities
theory in order to determine welfare; and a definition of paternalism as being an interference
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with a subject’s liberty or autonomy that is motivated exclusively by consideration for that
subject’s own good or welfare (“subject” will refer to the potential subject of paternalism).
Once I have working definitions for autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, I consider
arguments justifying paternalistic interferences. Because I especially wish to determine when
paternalistic interferences that conflict with a subject’s autonomous decision are justified, I begin
with Scoccia’s arguments for using hypothetical consent — which is based on what would
maximize the subject’s welfare — to justify paternalistic acts. Using Scoccia’s argument, I
consider a few cases in which concerns for welfare may justify paternalistic acts overriding the
subject’s autonomy.
However, hypothetical consent does not go very far in justifying paternalistic acts.
Therefore, I also consider arguments justifying paternalism in cases where the subject is not
necessarily fully autonomous when making or acting upon a decision. For example, Carter
argues that paternalistic acts are justified if autonomy has been waived through prior or
subsequent consent. Additionally, I look at justifying paternalism when the subject’s autonomy
is compromised through involuntariness or incompetence.

What is autonomy?
To determine if or when autonomy can be overridden by other concerns, we must first
define the conception of autonomy. The word “autonomy” literally means “the having or
making of one’s own laws,” as derived from the Greek words for “self” and “law” (Feinberg,
Harm... 27). However, this root word has come to refer to multiple different conceptions of
autonomy. Feinberg groups these conceptions into four broad types. First, “autonomy” refers to
the capacity to govern oneself; second, to the actual condition of self-government and its
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associated virtues; third, to an ideal complex of character traits related to the condition of selfgovernment; and finally, to the sovereign authority to govern oneself (Harm... 28). Of these four
categories, I will consider the first two. I won’t consider autonomy as an ideal, because here I
am more concerned with autonomy as exercised in the real world — I wish to determine whether
actual, rather than ideal, autonomy can be overridden by concerns for a subject’s welfare. I also
won’t consider autonomy as a right, because simply dealing with the right to autonomy doesn’t
seem to provide sufficient background as to what it is about autonomy that makes it worth
preserving and worthy of being given the status of “right” in the first place. Without such
background, it will be difficult to measure autonomy against other values such as welfare.
The conception of autonomy as a capacity, on the other hand, doesn’t reveal the value of
autonomy per se, but is nevertheless helpful because one must have the capacity to exercise
autonomy before it can be valued. This capacity is determined by one’s ability to make rational
choices (Feinberg, Harm... 28). Thus Christman writes that the basic capacity of autonomy
involves the ability “to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s
own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces” (Christman1). For reasons
and motives to be one’s own, they must come from an internal process of reflection and
evaluation as opposed to simply being imposed by external forces such as manipulation or
pressure (Christman). This definition of basic autonomy does not require that decisions come
entirely from one’s internal processes. It is meant to apply to most adults despite the fact that
they may not be ideally autonomous (Christman) while admitting that children are not yet fully
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Christman’s work is in a webpage, and so page numbers are not available.
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autonomous beings, although they usually gain more autonomy as they grow and learn2.
Similarly, the criterion of being able to make rational choices, or being “competent,” tends to
exclude the insane, severely retarded, the senile, and the comatose as well (Feinberg, Harm...
28). Although competence can be viewed as relative, such that normal adults may appear
“incompetent” relative to the gifted, the competence required to possess the capacity of
autonomy is typically measured relative to a threshold, such as a minimal level of intelligence or
relevant capability with regard to a decision or task. Thus, a subject is competent if she satisfies
this threshold (and thus she possesses the capacity for autonomy) or she’s incompetent if she
fails to satisfy the threshold (in which case she doesn’t possess the capacity for autonomy)
(Feinberg, Harm... 29).
Measuring competence by a threshold is important because it means that the gifted
cannot simply interfere with normal people’s choices on the grounds that they are “incompetent.”
Rather, if a subject meets the threshold for autonomy, then the interference of a more gifted
person does constitute undermining the subject’s autonomy. That said, once the threshold is met,
people’s capacities may differ in degree, and so some people who satisfy the threshold may be
less competent even if they aren’t incompetent (Feinberg, Harm... 30). As a result, Feinberg
notes, “the person whose relevant capacities are just above the bare threshold of competence that
qualifies him for de jure self-government may rightfully rule himself, but in fact he may rule
himself badly, unwisely, only partially” (Harm... 30). Consequently, even though interference
with a competent subject’s choices may undermine her autonomy, such interference could
nevertheless make her better off.
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In contrast, the ideal of autonomy may imply that a person is “maximally authentic and free of
manipulative, self-distorting influences” — a condition that serves as a goal rather than a
description of most adults (Christman)
5

The conception of autonomy as a capacity describes our actual ability to be autonomous,
but it doesn’t necessarily treat autonomy as having special value. Even though Feinberg implies
that the capacity for autonomy somehow leads to a right of autonomy in claiming, as quoted
above, that a person with the capacity for autonomy may “rightfully rule himself,” he doesn’t
show why the capacity for autonomy has value in itself. After all, the simple ability to do
something doesn’t automatically make it valuable; e.g., I can enter a stranger’s home by breaking
through a window, but we don’t value my ability to break into homes. Thus, it’s not just having
a capacity that’s important. In some way that differs from my capacity to break into houses, the
capacity for autonomy is especially worthy of preservation. Consequently, considering only the
capacity for autonomy isn’t sufficient for our purposes, as it doesn’t seem to explain what it is
about this capacity that we value.
The value of autonomy is partially illuminated by Feinberg’s second characterization of
autonomy as a condition. The condition of autonomy incorporates a variety of virtues drawn
from a conception of self-determination (Feinberg, Harm... 32). These virtues include selfpossession, distinct self-identity (individuality), authenticity, self-creation (self-determination),
self-legislation, moral authenticity, moral independence, integrity, self-control (self-discipline),
self-reliance, initiative, and responsibility for self (Feinberg, Harm... 32–43). In particular, I
wish to focus on the virtues of authenticity and self-determination.
According to Feinberg, “a person is authentic to the extent that... he can and does subject
his opinions and tastes to rational scrutiny... and can and does alter his convictions for reasons of
his own” (Harm... 33). These opinions and tastes may be partly influenced by others, but the
authentic person should evaluate and alter her opinions and tastes based on her own character as
well. In contrast, forming her opinions and tastes merely based on another’s (or society’s) lead
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would not be authentic and, on this account, the subject would fail to form her opinions and
tastes autonomously (Feinberg, Harm... 32). Authenticity ties very closely to the condition of
self-determination, under which a subject determines how her life goes according to her
character and judgments (Feinberg, Harm... 33), as both of these require that the subject reflect
rationally.
With respect to both of these conditions, Feinberg argues that we should not define
authenticity and self-determination so strictly that they are impossible to satisfy. Feinberg
acknowledges that “a person must already possess at least a rudimentary character before he can
hope to choose a new one” (Harm... 33). This rudimentary character may be partially formed
through one’s innate character, if such a character exists, but it is also inevitably the product of
our upbringing. To require that one’s character be solely formed from innate traits in order to be
authentic and self-determining would disqualify actual people from being authentic and selfdetermining. Thus, Feinberg suggests that we take a more flexible view under which we may
judge a person to be authentic and self-determining — and, under these conditions, autonomous
— even while recognizing that this person’s character has, unavoidably, been influenced by
outside forces, especially during the early formation of the person’s character (Feinberg, Harm...
33).
For example, a newborn’s character is very undeveloped, and so the extent to which the
newborn shapes her character is minimal (Feinberg, Harm... 34). Rather, at this point in her life,
the newborn’s character is influenced more by external forces, although Feinberg does believe
that the newborn’s own genes and early environment give the process of her characterdevelopment “its own distinctive slant” (Harm... 34). If parents are concerned for the autonomy
of the adult that the newborn will grow into, then as this “slant” becomes more apparent, the
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parents should respect that initial bias (Feinberg, Harm... 34). Thus, the child’s characterdevelopment is a combination of outside forces and her own input. As she grows older and her
character becomes more developed, the child’s input will become more and more influential in
her development “until at the arbitrarily fixed point of full maturity, [she] is at last fully in charge
of [herself], [her] more or less finished character the product of a complicated interaction of
external influences and ever-increasing contributions from [her] own earlier self” (Feinberg,
Harm... 34). In this case, Feinberg considers the resulting adult to be self-determining despite
the fact that her earlier development was necessarily influenced by external forces. Moreover,
the resulting adult here is what Feinberg sees as the ideal of a “self-made person” (Harm... 35),
which I take to be the closest approximation that could in reality be achieved. However, because
I am concerned not with ideal autonomy, but with actual autonomy, it seems that a subject may
be self-determining even if her parents do not raise her “with maximal regard” for her autonomy.
She may be self-determining — perhaps not ideally so, but generally so — if she contributes to
the development of her character as she matures and is, as an adult, able to evaluate and choose
her character without being driven merely by outside forces. What is important for autonomy is
not that the subject has never been externally influenced, but that she reflect rationally when
considering her principles and the adoption of other candidate principles and that she have a role
in the development of her character.
Dworkin echoes a very similar view of autonomy when he writes, “The idea of autonomy
is not merely an evaluative or reflective notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter
one’s preferences and to make them effective in one’s actions and, indeed, to make them
effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as one’s own” (The Theory...
17). In essence, Dworkin is adopting a view of autonomy based on authenticity and self-
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determination in calling for evaluating and reflecting upon one’s preferences or judgments. By
reflecting upon and adopting her preferences as her own, the subject is authentic based on
Feinberg’s description of authenticity as the condition of subjecting her opinions and tastes to
rational scrutiny and altering them accordingly. Similarly, in making her preferences effective in
her actions, the subject is self-determining because she is involved in creating her character and
determining the course of her life.
However, Dworkin elaborates further and suggests that, in order to satisfactorily evaluate
and reflect upon her preferences, the subject must consult her second- or higher-order desires
(The Theory... 15). This is because if we only consider first-order desires, we ignore “a crucial
feature of persons, their ability to reflect upon and adopt attitudes toward their first-order desires,
wishes, intentions” (Dworkin, The Theory... 15). For example, Dworkin considers the case of
Odysseus. In his travels, Odysseus approaches a sea known to harbor sirens that sing so
beautifully that sailors are driven to dive off their ships, only to drown in the waters. Desiring to
hear the sirens’ song but not to lose his life as a result, Odysseus commands his men to bind him
to the mast of the ship and to ignore his orders to be untied while he’s under the sirens’
influence. In this example, Odysseus’ commands to be untied are involuntary3, but aside from
consideration of voluntariness, Dworkin claims that “there is another dimension of [Odysseus’]
conduct that must be understood,” namely that Odysseus not only has first-order preferences to
be untied and to pursue the sirens, but he also has preferences about these preferences (The
Theory... 15). By ignoring the commands reflecting his first-order preferences, Odysseus’ men
actually promote Odysseus’ ability to be authentic and self-determining.
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Voluntariness will be considered in more detail later, but in the story of Odysseus, it is assumed
that the sirens’ song temporarily drives men to act in ways not according to their own judgments
and so they aren’t voluntary.
9

Dworkin takes Odysseus’ ability to evaluate and to identify with or reject his lower-order
preferences and reasons for which he acts as crucial to his authenticity (The Theory... 15).
Although a subject may not be able to change her first-order preferences at will, to be authentic
she should be able to subject them to rational scrutiny and to change them if there is sufficient
reason (Dworkin, The Theory... 16), where “sufficient reason” is presumably defined under
circumstances of rational scrutiny. Thus, authenticity is not based simply on the subject’s
character and desires, but on whether the subject is capable of deliberating on the reasons for
which she acts, requiring the use of higher-order desires (Dworkin, The Theory... 15).
It’s important to recognize that in evaluating her lower-order desires, the subject is
supposed to exercise some rationality — Dworkin calls for “critical” reflection upon first-order
preferences, desires, and wishes (The Theory... 20) — but not necessarily perfect rationality. In
contrast, Feinberg characterizes Rawls as emphasizing one’s rational will such that one’s
autonomy depends not on one’s actual reflection and consent, but on one’s hypothetical and
rational consent (Feinberg, Harm... 36). “Thus,” Rawls states, “acting autonomously is acting
from principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings, and that we are to
understand in this way” (qtd. Feinberg, Harm... 36). According to this view, Feinberg explains
that a person acts autonomously only if her actions are what hypothetical persons acting
rationally would do; and if the person were herself rational, she would act the same way (Harm...
36). “No matter that a person does not in fact consent to the rational principles,” Feinberg
writes. “What is required is that hypothetical persons in certain circumstances would consent to
them, and presumably he would too if only he were more rational” (Feinberg, Harm... 36).
Because it is not the subject’s actual process of evaluation and decision-making that counts but
simply what she would choose if she were fully rational, it seems that according to this view,
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autonomy is measured more by the content of a decision or action than by how the subject
arrives at the decision or action. Thus, Feinberg claims that on Rawls’ view, persons cannot be
simultaneously autonomous and wicked, dishonorable, or selfish, for hypothetical, rational
persons would not act wickedly, dishonorably, or selfishly (Harm... 36).
I reject the view of autonomy as being measured by the choices of hypothetical, rational
persons for similar reasons that I rejected the view of autonomy as an ideal: I am more concerned
with autonomy as exercised by actual people in the real world. For instance, suppose a subject
critically reflects upon her preferences and judgments and, concluding that these judgments and
preferences are in line with her character, she proceeds to act according to her judgments and
preferences; that is, the subject acts authentically and is self-determining. However, her action
fails to correspond to what a fully rational person would do. In this case, I believe that
interference with the subject’s action disrespects her autonomy, whereas presumably under
Rawls’ view, the subject’s action isn’t truly autonomous in the first place because it doesn’t
correspond to what a fully rational person would do. Requiring that a subject’s action align with
that of a fully rational person seems to strip many, if not most or all, subjects of their autonomy.
Here I desire a conception of autonomy that is applicable to actual people, even if the content of
their choices doesn’t appear ideal, and so I reject Rawls’ conception.
Instead, I will adopt Dworkin’s view that autonomy consists of both authenticity and selfdetermination, where authenticity refers to the reflection upon and evaluation of one’s
preferences and judgments as well as the ability to alter these preferences based on one’s
evaluations, while self-determination refers to being able to determine one’s life in accordance
with one’s character and judgments. I find Dworkin’s view attractive because he explains how
autonomy is exercised — by reflecting upon and evaluating one’s desires and acting accordingly
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— and so it is possible, to some extent, to differentiate cases in which a subject is autonomous
from one in which she is not autonomous.
For example, if I reflect upon my values and my goals for myself and, in accordance with
these values and goals, I choose to become an entrepreneur, then my pursuit of being an
entrepreneur is autonomous. In choosing my career, I act authentically by reflecting upon and
evaluating my values, while I am self-determining by acting upon my considerations in the
pursuit of this career. Because I am both authentic and self-determining, I am autonomous. On
the other hand, perhaps I have reflected upon my values and believe that becoming an
entrepreneur is most in accordance with my character, but I nevertheless end up going to medical
school because I am forced to do so or perhaps because I feel that I owe going to medical school
to my parents (if, for instance, they have given me an excellent education and expect me to
become a doctor, and I feel obliged to make them proud). In this case, although I may be
authentic, I am not self-determining because, forced by my obligations, I do not determine my
life in accordance with my considered judgments. Similarly, if my parents pressure me into
valuing membership in the medical profession and I then choose to follow their advice, I may be
self-determining, but my values aren’t authentic because they aren’t the product of my own
critical reflection and evaluation. Of course, it is possible that my parents are so convincing that
my higher-order values support the change in my value for being part of the medical profession
— after all, it is still possible for someone to authentically change her mind in response to other’s
arguments, provided that her change is ultimately caused by her own reflection and evaluation of
values.
In addition to explaining how autonomy is exercised, Dworkin claims that autonomy is
valuable because by evaluating and forming authentic judgments and then using them to
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determine one’s actions, “persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives,
and take responsibility for the kind of person they are” (The Theory... 20). That is, autonomy is
simply part of what it means to be a person. John Stuart Mill adopted a similar view; as Dworkin
writes, “It is because coercing a person for his own good denies [him] status as an independent
entity that Mill objects to it so strongly and in such absolute terms. ... It is the privilege and
proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret
experience in his own way” (Dworkin, “Paternalism” 117). Thus, we value autonomy because it
is part of who we are and how we see ourselves as individuals and persons. Furthermore, Mill
claimed that respecting autonomy is vital in creating an environment that promotes individuality
(Arneson 481). By respecting each other’s and our own autonomy, we create an environment
conducive to developing our own, unique life plans (Arneson 481).

There are several alternatives to an autonomy-based moral theory, such as theories based
on central values of care, happiness, or virtue (Christman). Here, I specifically wish to consider
the competing value of welfare. Many, if not most, philosophers — including both Mill and
Kant — recognize the value of welfare, although they often place the value of autonomy more
highly. But do they value autonomy too highly? Herzog points out that exclusive consideration
for autonomy may seem callous (151). The policy of neutrality in a liberal state may imply that
“We know what the good is, or we know at least some things it isn’t, but we’re going to respect
your rights and let you make the wrong choice” — this “hardly seems an inspiring public ethos,”
Herzog muses (151). While we may welcome the freedom afforded by state neutrality, the
silence of the neutral state may also be seen as “loathsome, a public declaration of our yellow-
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bellied relativism, or a cruel way of condemning individuals to spend their lives groping
uncertainly for leadership that the state should provide” (Herzog 148).
Given widespread (although not universal) opposition to laws that attempt to regulate
choices that many believe should be individualized, such as those regarding diet, we often seem
to accept the flaws of a neutral state in exchange for the freedom it grants us. Yet many people
simultaneously embrace some paternalistic interferences with our autonomy, such as seatbelt
laws or the prohibition of highly addictive and dangerous drugs. These are cases in which our
welfare may seem to override our right to autonomy. Admittedly, one could consider seatbelt
laws, for example, as simply enforcing an action (wearing seatbelts) that we would choose for
ourselves but are too weak-willed to consistently do. However, I don’t believe that all
paternalistic laws can be conceived of in this matter; specifically, it seems that the prohibition of
highly dangerous drugs is enforced not merely because we personally would otherwise be too
weak-willed to resist drugs, nor solely to protect us from the ill effects of others’ drug addictions,
but also in part because we care for others’ welfare and wish to intervene on their behalf as well.
In order to determine if and when concern for a subject’s welfare can justifiably outweigh her
right to autonomy, we must first understand what is meant by “welfare.”

Welfare
In the appendix to Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit considers three main kinds of
theories about self-interest or what is best for someone (which I take to be her “welfare”):
Hedonistic Theories, Desire-Fulfillment Theories, and Objective List Theories (493). According
to Hedonistic Theories, that which would make the subject happiest, i.e. have the most pleasant
mental state, is best for her (Parfit 493). In what Parfit considers the most compelling Hedonistic

14

Theory, Preference-Hedonism, a subject’s well-being is considered in terms of her desired
mental states (Parfit 493). Maximizing a subject’s desired mental states and minimizing her
undesired mental states increases her welfare. Thus, the more desired a mental state is, the more
the subject’s welfare is increased; the more undesired a mental state is, the more the subject’s
welfare is decreased. In order to maximize a subject’s welfare, then, one should aim to fulfill her
strongest desire, whether that be past, present, or future. So, for example, when Freud refused
anesthetics near the end of his life because he preferred thinking in torment rather than being
“confusedly euphoric,” not using anesthetics was better for him (Parfit 494). If one adopts
Preference-Hedonism as one’s theory of welfare, interfering with the fulfillment of a subject’s
desires would, by definition, be worse for her.
However, in some cases it is possible to interfere with a subject’s choices in a way that
does help fulfill her desires and therefore is good for her. First of all, a subject’s past or future
desires may be stronger than her present ones. For example, although a high school student may
presently desire to skip class and not do her homework, her future desire to go to a good college
may be stronger than her present desires. In this case, assuming that attending class helps to
fulfill her future desire of going to a good college, interfering with her choice to skip class
increases her welfare.
Secondly, in assessing the subject’s desires, the Preference-Hedonist includes
hypothetical in addition to actual desires (Parfit 496). Hypothetical desires refer to those desires
that a subject would have if she had chosen otherwise. For example, Parfit considers a subject
with two choices: staying home and going to a party. Perhaps the subject chooses to stay home
and read, and her present desire to have a peaceful evening is thereby fulfilled. Yet the subject
also had the choice of going to a party, and so one can consider the counterfactual case in which
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she does choose to go to the party. Under these circumstances, the subject would desire to have
an exciting and fun evening, and she does. The desire to have a fun evening that she would have
if she had chosen to go to the party is her hypothetical desire.
Either course of action — staying home or going to the party — would result in a
pleasant evening for the subject that she would not later regret (Parfit 496). Because the
subject’s desires are thereby fulfilled, her welfare is increased. However, if going to the party
would fulfill the subject’s desires only a little, whereas staying home would fulfill her desires
more, then Parfit argues that we should still be able to claim that staying home is the better
alternative with regard to the subject’s welfare (496). Thus, in Preference-Hedonism, in order to
maximize one’s welfare, one should fulfill the desire — whether it be actual or hypothetical —
that is strongest (Parfit 496). Furthermore, if the subject has more available alternatives at the
time (perhaps instead of staying home or going to the party, she could also choose to visit her
sister or to walk her dog), then one must also consider the hypothetical desires that the subject
would have in any of these available alternatives (Parfit 496). If there is more than one
“strongest” desire, then choosing to satisfy any of those strongest desires is appropriate for
maximizing welfare.
The second set of theories considered by Parfit is Desire-Fulfillment Theories, which
claim that “what would be best for someone is what, throughout his life, would best fulfill his
desires” (493). Again, these desires may be past, present, future, or hypothetical. There are two
main Desire-Fulfillment Theories. According to the first, the Unrestricted Theory, we consider
all of the subject’s desires, irrespective of whether they are about her life or others’, in order to
determine what is best for the subject (Parfit 494). Parfit rejects this theory and claims that
considering those desires that don’t actually pertain to one’s life is implausible. For example, if I
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meet a stranger who has a terrible disease, my sympathy may be aroused at the time, and I may
desire that this stranger be cured. However, if it later so happens that the stranger is cured, then,
Parfit argues — contra the Unrestricted Theory — my life hasn’t actually improved by the
satisfaction of this desire because the desire isn’t about my own life (494).
In some sense, it might seem that my desire that the stranger be cured is about my life;
one could say that I wish to lead a life in which the stranger is cured. To illustrate the difference
between this type of desire and desires that are “actually” about my life, Parfit likens the former
desires to so-called Cambridge-changes. Cambridge-changes are changes in true statements that
can be made about an object but which are opposed to “real” changes in the object itself. For
example, Parfit invites us to “suppose that I cut my cheek while shaving. This causes a real
change in me. It also causes a change in Confucius. It becomes true, of Confucius, that he lived
on a planet in which later one more cheek was cut. This is merely a Cambridge-change” (494).
If I cut my cheek while shaving, there is a change in the true statements that can be made about
Confucius, but Confucius wasn’t changed in and of himself. Similarly, if a stranger is cured,
then I am not changed, and therefore my life isn’t made better by the stranger’s recovery. In
contrast, desires about my own life typically involve something I wish to have or do or the kind
of person I wish to be4. Thus, because the stranger’s recovery does not affect something I wish
to have or do or the kind of person I wish to be, my life isn’t made better by his recovery. It is
not important that the cured person be a stranger to whom I have no other ties; if a dear friend
happens to recover from a disease, my life is still not made better by his recovery. However, if I
invest myself in helping a friend recover from a disease, and she does subsequently recover, then
my life is made better. Through the success of my efforts, my desires regarding the kind of
4

This way of distinguishing desires about my own life was stated by Julie Tannenbaum, who
drew on ideas from Nozick.
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person I wish to be (e.g. one who is there for her friends) are satisfied, thereby increasing my
welfare.
Instead, Parfit finds Success Theory, another Desire-Fulfillment Theory, more
compelling. In Success Theory, only the satisfaction of those desires about one’s own life
contribute to one’s welfare (Parfit 494). This theory is similar to Preference-Hedonism except in
that Success Theory “appeals to all of our preferences about our own lives” whereas PreferenceHedonism “appeals only to preferences about those present features of our lives that are
introspectively discernible” (Parfit 494). To illustrate the distinction, Parfit considers the desire
not to be deceived by others. According to Preference-Hedonism, actually being deceived
doesn’t make me worse off if I’m not aware of the deception; all that matters is my state of mind,
not the reality of my situation (Parfit 494). In contrast, according to Success Theory, it is reality
that determines how well off I am. Merely believing that others aren’t deceiving me doesn’t
make me better off if I am in fact deceived (Parfit 494).
As with Preference-Hedonism, interfering with a subject’s preferred decision generally
won’t increase the subject’s welfare under Success Theory. However, again interference may
increase a subject’s welfare in cases where the subject’s past, future, or hypothetical desires are
stronger than her present ones. In addition, if the subject’s decision is intended to satisfy one of
her desires but, in fact, it won’t (i.e. she’s mistaken), then interference that fulfills her desires
could also promote her welfare. In contrast, under Preference-Hedonism, if the subject falsely
believes that X is true, and as a result she has her desired mental state, then her welfare is
increased even if X is not, in fact, true. Consequently, under Preference-Hedonism, it would not
necessarily promote a subject’s welfare to disillusion her and thus remove her desired mental
state. Indeed, in Preference-Hedonism, because the subject’s mental state determines her
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welfare, actions that trick her into believing that X is the case and thereby give her desired
mental states could potentially make her “better” off. Because Success Theory doesn’t only
consider the subject’s mental states (does the subject believe that she’s achieving what she
desires to achieve?), but also the actual, external satisfaction of her desires (is she, in fact,
achieving what she desires to achieve?), I find Success Theory the more attractive of the two.
However, both Preference-Hedonistic and Desire-Fulfillment Theories may be
considered problematic for several reasons. First, insofar as one’s preferences or desires are
shaped by outside forces such as society, culture, or even past actions that give rise to
preferences or addictions, it seems questionable to claim that satisfying these desires can increase
one’s welfare. For example, consider a society in which women have a lower social status and
consequently men have greater opportunities than women. If women are raised to believe that
such a social order is desirable, then according to Preference-Hedonism or Desire-Fulfillment
Theories, being given fewer opportunities increases the women’s welfare. Yet it seems that
promoting inequality cannot truly be in the women’s best interests.
A second worry, expressed by Cass Sunstein, is that many of our preferences are
“endogenous,” meaning that they are malleable and may change depending on the context in
which the preference is expressed, past consumption choices, and cultural and legal factors (5).
For Sunstein, who wishes to consider the proper extent of government intervention with people’s
choices, endogenous preferences are worrisome because if preferences aren’t fixed, then a
democracy that wishes to maximize welfare gains cannot simply apply one set of rules for all
time (10). Indeed, the very rules or policies created by the government may themselves
influence people’s preferences. Thus, for example, giving women the right not to be sexually
harassed will impact people’s attitudes towards sexual harassment (8). However, although the
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changeability of desires makes rule-setting difficult, it is not itself an objection to calculating
welfare based on desire fulfillment.
Another, more serious, challenge posed by the malleability of desires is the implication
that, in order to increase a subject’s welfare, one could either satisfy her desires or change her
desires in order to align with her current situation. In some cases, if the subject’s desires are
overly optimistic (e.g. if the subject desires something extremely difficult and unlikely to attain
such as learning to fly), then it may indeed be best for her to reevaluate her desires and adjust
accordingly. Yet in other cases, changing a subject’s desires to lower her standards does not
intuitively seem to increase her welfare. Returning to the example of an unequal society,
suppose that many women are currently dissatisfied with the inequality of opportunities
available to men and women — that is, unlike the previous example, the women desire equality
despite the inequalities with which they were raised. Women’s welfare could be increased by
eliminating the inequality, or women could be encouraged to change their desires and embrace
the current state of affairs instead. If women embraced a lower social status, then their new
desires would be satisfied, and accordingly, on Preference-Hedonistic or Desire-Fulfillment
Theories, their welfare would seemingly be “increased.” This conclusion is counter-intuitive in
that, although the women’s (altered) desires are now satisfied, their sub-optimal condition of
living in an unequal society remains the same.
The third main objection to Preference-Hedonism and Desire-Fulfillment Theories is that
people’s desires may simply be bizarre, in which case fulfilling those desires doesn’t necessarily
seem to promote their welfare. For example, Parfit imagines a case where a man wants to spend
his life counting blades of grass when he knows that he could instead achieve significant,
beneficial results pursuing applied math (Parfit 500). On Preference-Hedonism or Desire-
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Fulfillment Theories, if the man’s strongest desire truly is to count blades of grass, then counting
blades of grass would be better for him, a conclusion that may be difficult to accept.
On the one hand, I am not entirely convinced that pursuing math is indeed better for this
man. Certainly it would be better for others if this man achieved beneficial results in math, and
the results could benefit the man as well. But if the man truly desired to count blades of grass
and found great satisfaction in doing so, then — assuming that he didn’t later come to seriously
regret all the time wasted on grass — I find it somewhat plausible that this man might be better
off counting blades of grass. Again, this pursuit isn’t in the best interests of others, but here I’m
only concerned with the man’s own welfare. If the satisfaction of his desire conflicted with
other’s interests (e.g. if the man’s desire weren’t to count blades of grass, which in and of itself is
fairly harmless, but instead were to cause pain to others), then we may well be justified in
interfering with the fulfillment of his desires in order to protect others. But where only the man
is concerned, it may seem that if he wants to count grass, then perhaps he is best off doing so.
On the other hand, a man that chooses to count blades of grass for long periods sounds
crazy, in which case rather than sitting back and accepting his desire to count grass, it would be
more to the man’s benefit if one helped him to reach a healthier state of mind. Yet PreferenceHedonism and Desire-Fulfillment Theories do admit that the man’s welfare can be increased
through intervention if the man has past, future, or hypothetical desires — in this case, his
hypothetical desires could be drawn based on his alternative choice of pursuing math rather than
counting blades of grass — that are stronger than his present ones. For example, if one
intervenes to help the man reach a healthier mental state and his subsequent desires to reach
mathematical greatness are stronger than his current ones to count grass, then it is better for the
man to be thwarted in his current desires in favor of his future ones. If, however, the man’s
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present desire to count grass truly outweighs all his others — or perhaps he is permanently crazy
and his past, future, and hypothetical desires all involve counting grass — then I am not
completely convinced that interfering with his grass-counting in favor of pursuing math really is
better.
Regardless of the third problem with Preference-Hedonism and Desire-Fulfillment
Theories, the first two problems — first, that many preferences are shaped by culture and do not
necessarily reflect the subject’s best interests, and second, that changing a subject’s desires to fit
reality rather than changing reality to satisfy her preferences do not, contrary to these theories,
seem to equivalently promote her welfare — stand. As a result, we need a theory that does not
simply consider a subject’s subjective values. Parfit’s response is to consider Objective List
Theories. According to these theories, some things have value for us irrespective of our desires.
Some things simply are good for us and others aren’t (Parfit 493). Examples of good things
could be moral goodness, rational activity, the satisfaction of basic needs such as the need for
nourishment or emotional connection to others, the development of one’s abilities, knowledge,
and awareness of true beauty, while examples of bad things could be betrayal, manipulation,
slander, deception, the deprivation of liberty or dignity, and enjoying sadistic pleasure (Parfit
499). Although such good and bad things might align with good and bad things under Success
Theory (e.g. in both cases, deception is bad), the value of things is determined in different ways.
Specifically, Parfit writes that “On the Success Theory it is, for instance, bad for someone to be
deceived if and because this is not what he wants. The Objective List Theorist makes the reverse
claim. People want not to be deceived because this is bad for them” (499). Thus, the Objective
List Theorist may respond to the man’s desire to count grass by arguing that counting grass (at
least as a long-term goal) is not objectively good for him because, drawing from Parfit’s
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examples of good things, counting grass is not rational activity, nor does it satisfy the man’s
basic needs or develop his abilities or knowledge.
The problem with Parfit’s Objective List Theory is that he doesn’t specify how these
“objective” values are known, and what they draw their value from if not our own subjective
values. Why, for example, is rational activity good for the grass-counting man if he doesn’t
value rational activity?5 Nussbaum answers this objection by claiming not that there are
objective values independent of humans, but that there are some values that humans share —
lending these values a sense of objectivity — which can be found by looking to history and
human experience (69). As she writes, even if one claims that “we are always dealing with our
own interpretations anyhow, [one] must acknowledge that universal conceptions of the human
are prominent and pervasive among such interpretations” (Nussbaum 69). Rather than claiming
a universal conception of the human “as part of the independent furniture of the world,”
Nussbaum makes the more modest empirical claim that, when one looks to history and human
experience, one does find universal ideas of the human being, which can be used as a starting
point for identifying common notions of the human good (69). For example, Nussbaum cites
Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, who was raised in two cultures, visiting
grandparents in Ghana and others in rural England among relatives in further countries. Through
his interactions with people from numerous cultures, Kwame doesn’t notice “unbridgeable alien
‘otherness’” so much as “a great deal of human commonality” (69). Nussbaum admits that
conceptions of humanity can and do differ between societies but nevertheless affirms that there is
enough overlap in these conceptions to outline a notion of the human good (74).
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Parfit ultimately embraces a view of welfare that is a composite of Desire-Fulfillment Theories
and Objective List Theories. However, because he doesn’t explain how objective values are
known, a composite containing such values is also unsatisfying.
23

In particular, Nussbaum identifies that as humans, we share similar bodily constraints and
needs such as hunger and thirst, need for shelter, sexual desires, and mobility; the capacity for
pleasure and pain; cognitive capability, including perceiving, imagining, and thinking; early
infant development; practical reason; affiliation with other humans; “relatedness” to other
species and nature; humor and play; and separateness (75–79). Admittedly, these needs may not
be shared by each individual human. However, typically those individuals who do not share
these needs — e.g. a person who has no affiliation with other humans (perhaps an absolute
hermit or a sociopath) — are seen as odd or crazy, outside of the typical societal norms. Thus,
even if individuals do not all share these needs, as a whole, different societies do.
Moreover, because we do share these traits as humans, Nussbaum believes that we can
further identify capabilities without which a life would be “too lacking, too impoverished, to be
human at all” — and hence, neither could it be a good human life (80). As examples of
capabilities needed for a good human life, Nussbaum offers, among others, the capabilities of
being able to live the length of a normal human lifespan, being able to have good health, being
able to avoid unnecessary and non-beneficial pain, being able to use the senses, and being able to
form a conception of the good and to reflect critically on the planning of one’s own life (83–84).
Because she treats this list as one of separate components, a good life is only attainable by
ensuring each of the capabilities; that is, one cannot have a good life by trading off one capability
for another (85–86). Having each of these capabilities is necessary to having a good life.
How, then, does this apply to the man whose deepest desire is to count grass? If counting
grass endangers any of the capabilities necessary for a good life, then by definition, the man
cannot have a good life counting grass. And indeed, simply based on the capabilities given
above, choosing to spend his life counting grass quite possibly implies that the man does not
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currently possess the ability to have good [mental?] health and the ability to form a conception of
the good and to reflect critically on the planning of his life. The decision to count grass blades
may not be, in and of itself, detrimental to the man’s welfare, but it indicates that he doesn’t
currently possess the capabilities for a good life. Therefore, if one were considering the man’s
welfare, then rather than simply allowing the man to count grass as per Success Theory, one
might first wish to ensure that the man possessed the requisite capabilities for a good life. Once
he possesses these capabilities, however, Nussbaum allows that he can choose whether or not to
exercise his capabilities. For instance, she points out that even though the need for sustenance is
common to humans and the corresponding capability of having sufficient food is required for a
good life, “a person with plenty of food can always choose to fast” (94). On her capabilities
theory, the values concern what one is able to do; having these capabilities, one may then act
according to one’s subjective desires and preferences.
I find Nussbaum’s formulation of objective values attractive because she provides for
certain criteria for a good life which are objective in the sense that they are argued to apply to all
humans. However, her support for these criteria is not based on a metaphysical nature of
humans, but on empirical evidence from human experience indicating that across history, there
are certain needs and values that people share. Using these “objective” criteria, we can escape
entirely subjective valuations that might, for example, encourage women to accept inequalities
for the sake of their “welfare.” On the other hand, by citing capabilities rather than concrete
actions as the criteria for a good life, Nussbaum acknowledges the importance of individuals’
subjective desires with regard to their lives. Although certain capabilities are necessary for a
good life, beyond the satisfaction of these capabilities, it is the fulfillment of the individuals’
subjective desires that further increases or decreases their welfare. Thus, to me Nussbaum’s
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capabilities theory provides the best balance between considering the objective reality of the
situation and respecting a subject’s personal goals and wishes. Therefore, I will use Nussbaum’s
capabilities theory as the grounds for evaluating a subject’s welfare. In addition, this theory
opens the possibility of intervention on behalf of the subject’s welfare in cases where either the
subject doesn’t currently possess the capabilities for a good life (as with the grass-obsessed man)
or the subject’s decision doesn’t actually best reflect her subjective desires. Whether such
interventions are actually justified in overriding the subject’s autonomy remains to be seen.

Now that we have conceptions of autonomy and welfare, I will consider conflicts
between these two values. Such a conflict may involve separate people’s autonomy and welfare
— for example, my autonomous desire to pickpocket someone conflicts with my victim’s
welfare. Alternatively, the conflict may involve the autonomy and welfare of a single person,
which is the category of conflict I wish to consider. Thus, if I choose to drive without a seatbelt,
this choice conflicts with my welfare if I end up in an accident and am injured because I wasn’t
wearing my seatbelt. In a liberal state, laws (e.g. some privacy laws) generally rule in favor of a
subject’s autonomy rather than her welfare; what a subject chooses to do to herself, as long as it
doesn’t interfere with others’ welfare, is her own choice to make and act upon, even if the choice
doesn’t promote her welfare. Aside from formal laws, people in our society also frequently
respect others’ autonomous self-regarding choices that don’t promote welfare. If someone
wishes to eat at McDonald’s every day, then we may allow her to act upon this choice even
though we know that eating at McDonald’s every day is unhealthy and likely won’t increase her
welfare (at least not in the long run).
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We are frequently willing to defer to people’s autonomous choices that seem to be to the
detriment of their welfare. In part, this is because we, however well-meaning, do not know a
subject’s feeling and circumstances as deeply as does the subject herself, and so interfering is
more likely than not to diminish the subject’s welfare rather than increase it. Overall, we are all
better off respecting each other’s autonomy. Yet this argument fails to prohibit all cases of
paternalism. Although a subject may usually be the best judge of her welfare, she nevertheless
may make decisions that others can clearly see are contrary to her welfare, decisions that she will
predictably regret later. Thus, both in laws and in our relationships, we may wish to interfere
with people’s autonomous decisions that are detrimental to their welfare. The wish to interfere
with others’ autonomy in favor of their welfare can be seen in such laws as those requiring the
use of seatbelts or in cases where, for example, one friend may try to intervene in another’s illfated relationship. Typically, the practice of interfering with someone’s autonomy in favor of
her welfare is considered paternalism. Eventually, I wish to consider when paternalism is
justifiable, but first I will consider more specific accounts of what exactly should be included
under the term “paternalism.”

Paternalism
Typically, paternalism is roughly defined as an interference with a subject’s liberty or
autonomy that is motivated exclusively by consideration for that subject’s own good or welfare
(Arneson 471; Dworkin, “Paternalism” 108). This interference generally takes the form of
coercion or manipulation, although Dworkin argues that “there are no methods of influencing
people that are necessarily immune to being used paternalistically” (Dworkin, “Paternalism:
Some...” 107). Shiffrin takes an even broader view of paternalism based not on the means or
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even results of the interference, but on the interferer’s motives. I’ll consider the steps that
Shiffrin takes to formulate her characterization of paternalism in order to better articulate what
paternalism entails.
Shiffrin pursues her characterization of paternalism by assessing “what is central in our
normative reactions to paternalism” and using this assessment to create a conception of
paternalism that “complements and makes intelligible our sense of paternalism’s normative
significance” (212). That is, in order to characterize paternalism, Shiffrin considers cases of
possible paternalistic action and then evaluates whether such cases arouse the reaction that we
associate with standard cases of paternalism (such as coercing a subject for her own welfare) and
whether these cases make sense of what it is about paternalism that we feel matters. By
evaluating possible actions not on specific features (such as means or results) connected to them
but on our normative reactions to the actions, Shiffrin delves into the significance of features
typically associated with paternalism, such as freedom, the subject’s will, and the paternalist’s
motivation.
To begin, she considers the connection of paternalism and freedom. Shiffrin admits that
paternalism and freedom are strongly connected but claims that paternalism mustn’t necessarily
involve violating an autonomy right, interfering with a subject’s liberty, or even simply
diminishing the subject’s freedom (213). Instead, paternalistic action may consist of an omission
or refusal to do something (Shiffrin 213). For example, Shiffrin offers, suppose that I am
planning to build a set of shelves and ask an acquaintance for help. Perhaps my acquaintance
would be happy to help build a set of shelves, but she feels that I ask for help too much and am
consequently not given the chance to learn necessary skills for myself. That is, she feels that I
would actually be better off building the shelves myself, and on these grounds, she refuses to
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help me. In this case, my autonomy and freedom haven’t been affected — my acquaintance’s
refusal to help doesn’t make me any less autonomous or free to do as I please than I was before I
asked for her help — but Shiffrin argues that my acquaintance’s refusal is nevertheless
paternalistic because she is substituting her judgment for mine on what would be good for me
(213). Shiffrin points out that, in contrast, if my acquaintance voiced her reasons for refusal and
convinced me to build the shelves without her, then she wouldn’t be acting paternalistically
(213). What makes the acquaintance’s action paternalistic isn’t the refusal itself, but the
“substitution of judgment and the circumvention of an agent’s [my] will” in her refusal (213).
Not only does paternalism not necessarily diminish a subject’s freedom, as in the
example above, but paternalistic actions may actually enhance a subject’s freedom if the subject
has explicitly stated that she doesn’t want too many choices (Shiffrin 214). That is, it would be
paternalistic for my acquaintance to provide me with choices simply because she believes that,
despite my desire not to have such choices, I am mistaken in keeping myself in such ignorance or
that I would develop a better character by being tested by multiple choices (Shiffrin 214).
Similarly, Dworkin points out that such methods as insisting that I hear arguments for my own
good may be paternalistic if I want to make my decision impulsively (“Paternalism: Some...”
107). Hearing arguments for my own good may enhance my freedom by expanding my sight
beyond my impulsiveness, but, as in Shiffrin’s examples, the acquaintance is acting
paternalistically because again, she is substituting her judgment for mine regarding how I should
develop my agency (Shiffrin 214).
In the above examples, Shiffrin argues that paternalistic action mustn’t necessarily
diminish a subject’s freedom. She then proceeds to argue that neither is paternalism necessarily
contrary to a subject’s will (Shiffrin 214). Specifically, Shiffrin invites us to suppose that one is
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worrying that a subject will, when presented with a certain choice, make the wrong choice. To
prevent the subject from making the wrong choice, one preemptively makes the choice for her
(Shiffrin 214). For example, a mother might intercept a credit card offer that arrives in the mail
for her son and throw it away without telling him in order to prevent her son from becoming the
victim of extravagant interest rates (Shiffrin 214). Even if her son doesn’t later object to his
mother’s actions, Shiffrin claims that the mother’s actions were nonetheless paternalistic,
because once again, the mother substitutes her judgment for her son’s regarding what choices are
best for him (214). In each of these cases, Shiffrin claims that what makes the action
paternalistic are not the effects or expected outcomes of the action (whether they be freedomdiminishing, freedom-enhancing, or even contrary to the subject’s will) but rather the motivation
behind the action (215). The interference is paternalistic when the interferer substitutes her
judgment for the subject’s.
Of course, not all cases of substituting one’s judgment for another’s are cases of
paternalism. I am clearly not acting paternalistically, for example, if I ask your advice on which
car I should buy but ultimately decide to ignore your advice and buy the car that most pleases me
instead. Usually, cases of paternalism involve the interferer’s substituting her judgment for the
subject’s on matters regarding the subject’s own welfare because the interferer believes that she
knows how to better promote the subject’s welfare.
However, Shiffrin argues that this characterization is still overly narrow on two accounts.
First, paternalism doesn’t necessarily involve a substitution of judgment. Rather, one may act
paternalistically by thwarting a subject’s actions even when the subject’s judgment is agreed to
be appropriate (Shiffrin 215). For example, it’s paternalistic to hide a subject’s cigarettes
without her consent even if she agrees that she should quit smoking (Shiffrin 215). Thus,
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paternalism can be motivated to maneuver around the subject’s agency, not just her judgment
(Shiffrin 215).
Secondly, Shiffrin doesn’t believe that paternalism should be restricted to cases in which
the interference is motivated by concern for the subject’s welfare (216). Instead, Shiffrin argues
that paternalism could involve any cases in which the interferer aims “to take over or control
what is properly within the agent’s [Shiffrin’s ‘agent’ is who I’ve been calling the ‘subject’] own
legitimate domain of judgment or action” (216). The subject’s own legitimate domain of
judgment or action includes her welfare but is not limited to her welfare. For instance, Shiffrin
writes, “Suppose B is the legitimate, duly appointed manager of a group of workers. A
substitutes a policy memo that A has written for a memo of B’s — not from concern for B’s
welfare, but from concern for the workers that B manages. A believes that her memo is clearer
or establishes a better policy” (216). In this case, even though A is not motivated by concern for
B’s welfare, Shiffrin claims that she nevertheless acts paternalistically by presuming that her
judgment is superior to B’s regarding matters that are legitimately within B’s domain of
judgment and by acting upon this presumption (216).
In summary, Shiffrin’s writes that paternalism by A toward B may be characterized as
behavior that is “a) Aimed to have (or to avoid) an effect on B or her sphere of legitimate
agency; b) That involves the substitution of A’s judgment or agency for B’s; c) Directed at B’s
own interests or matters that legitimately lie within B’s control; and d) Undertaken on the
grounds that compared to B’s judgment or agency with respect to those interests or other matters,
A regards her judgment or agency to be (or as likely to be), in some respect, superior to B’s”
(218). As mentioned earlier, Shiffrin arrives at this characterization by evaluating potential cases
of paternalism, including those given above, with respect to our “normative reactions” to
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paternalism. Thus, rather than characterizing paternalism through specific features — in
contrast, Dworkin characterizes paternalistic action by the features of a) being an interference
with a subject’s liberty or autonomy and b) being motivated or justified by consideration for that
subject’s own good or welfare — Shiffrin characterizes paternalism based on whether various
cases arouse the “normative reactions” we associate with paternalism.
She admits that most accounts of paternalism do not include as broad of a range of
behaviors as her own, but questions why we generally draw such a “bright line” between cases in
which the interference is motivated by concern for the subject’s own welfare as opposed to cases
in which the interference is simply motivated by the belief that the interferer’s judgment is
superior to the subject’s regarding some matter within the subject’s proper domain of control
(Shiffrin 217–218). Both of these cases, Shiffrin claims, “involve the same sort of intrusion into
and insult to a person’s range of agency,” and this is what we react to as being paternalistic
(218). However, Shiffrin doesn’t explain what she means by “normative reactions” to
paternalism, aside from implying a vague sense of unease or outrage over paternalistic acts.
Furthermore, she fails to consider cases in which paternalistic acts might be seen in a positive
light (i.e. ones in which the acts might not be considered such an “insult” to a person’s range of
agency), further obscuring the type of reaction towards paternalism that she expects. As a result,
Shiffrin’s use of normative reactions as the basis for evaluating whether an act should fall under
the term “paternalism” or not is vague and lacks strong argumentative force — after all, if one
doesn’t share her normative reactions to specific cases, then the points that she draws from these
cases are unpersuasive.
Although I do find Shiffrin’s characterization compelling in that it appears to capture
cases that “seem” paternalistic despite lacking features that are commonly associated with
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paternalism, I disagree that cases in which the subject’s own welfare is not at stake should be
included in paternalism. That is, I agree with Shiffrin to the extent that paternalistic action does
not necessarily diminish the subject’s freedom, as it may occur through an omission or could
even enhance freedom if the subject explicitly asked not to have too many choices. I also agree
that one can act paternalistically before the subject is aware of the matter, and so paternalism
doesn’t necessarily override the subject’s will. And finally, I agree that a paternalistic action
may be motivated by the belief that the subject’s judgment is sound but her ability to act is
compromised, such as someone addicted to cigarettes who desires to quit but nevertheless
continues to smoke.
Shiffrin arrives at these “expansions” to the notion of paternalism by evaluating specific
examples, but I don’t believe that these features in fact greatly expand the notion of paternalism.
All of these paternalistic actions have one feature in common, a feature that was already included
in Dworkin’s characterization: the paternalistic action interferes with the subject’s autonomy.
Earlier, I adopted Dworkin’s characterization of autonomy in which autonomy entails that the
subject reflects upon and evaluates her preferences before adopting them as her own — i.e. the
subject’s preferences are authentic — and is also able to make her preferences effective in her
actions. Using this notion of autonomy, actions of omission such as my acquaintance’s refusal to
help me to build shelves because she believes I would be better off developing those skills on my
own interfere with my autonomy; by refusing, without explanation, to assist me in building
shelves, my acquaintance prevents me from evaluating my respective preferences (e.g. to be
helped versus to learn how to build shelves on my own) and thus I am unable to exercise my
autonomy in this case. I am similarly prevented from exercising my autonomy in cases where
my acquaintance acts before I am aware of the matter and am able to choose for myself. And if I
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explicitly ask not to have too many choices, then I have already made an autonomous decision to
limit myself, and so forcing further information on me defies my autonomous decision. Finally,
in the case of the cigarette addict, the criteria that autonomy consists not only of the ability to
reflect upon and evaluate preferences but also to make preferences effective in action means that
interference with the subject’s ability to act upon her preference to smoke again thwarts her
autonomy. Therefore, Shiffrin’s initial expansions to the notion of paternalism may in fact be
contained within the feature that paternalistic action interferes with a subject’s autonomy, given
the notion of autonomy that I have adopted.
On the other hand, I disagree with Shiffrin that interferences motivated by concern for the
subject’s welfare and those motivated by the belief that the interferer’s judgment is superior to
the subject’s regarding some other matter within the subject’s proper domain of control truly
involve the same sort of intrusion into a person’s agency. The subject’s own welfare is, to some
extent, within her proper domain of control (I won’t say that her welfare is exclusively within her
domain of control, although this may be the case, because I haven’t addressed whether others
have some legitimate claim on the subject’s welfare as well). Even if the subject’s welfare does
fall within others’ proper domains of control as well, I take it as uncontroversial that, at least in
cases of autonomous subjects, the subject has a greater claim on controlling her welfare than
others. Therefore, to interfere with the subject’s judgment or actions on behalf of her welfare is
to interfere on a matter that is, to some extent (call it X), within the subject’s proper domain of
control.
Now consider cases in which the interference isn’t motivated by concern for the subject’s
welfare but by concern for a third party, such as in the example where A substitutes her memo
for B’s because she believes that her memo is clearer or establishes a better policy. Although

34

managing the third party may be within B’s proper domain of control, I don’t believe that the
extent to which managing the party is in B’s domain of control is the same extent X as before.
I’m not sure whether a duly appointed manager has a greater or lesser legitimate say over
managing her party than she has over managing her own welfare — that is, I’m not sure whether
the extent to which managing the party is within B’s domain of control is greater or less than X.
Nevertheless, the factors that put her welfare and managing her party within B’s domain of
control differ significantly. Namely, we tend to suppose that B has a legitimate say over her
welfare unless we are given a strong reason not to suppose so (e.g. perhaps B is severely
mentally impaired), whereas B is only given legitimate say over her party through others’
approval as shown by, e.g., promotion or voting. Because the domain of control is conferred
very differently in these cases, it seems reasonable to suppose that the extent to which one’s
welfare is within one’s proper domain of control is a different extent than that to which
managing a party is within one’s domain of control. Therefore, interferences with judgments and
actions regarding these domains of control may constitute different sorts of intrusions into a
person’s agency.
Interferences with a subject’s judgment or actions that are motivated by a concern for her
welfare are those typically classified as paternalistic, and indeed what Dworkin would classify as
paternalistic as well. In contrast, interfering with a subject’s management of a party may be an
intrusion into her proper domain of control, but I would not characterize this intrusion as being
paternalistic. Moreover, here I am concerned with the conflicting values of autonomy and
welfare, and so other potentially “paternalistic” interferences that aren’t motivated by concern
for the subject’s welfare aren’t particularly relevant in this context. Therefore, I ultimately adopt
the characterization of paternalism given at the beginning of this section. Namely, I will treat

35

paternalism as an interference with a subject’s liberty or autonomy that is motivated exclusively
by consideration for that subject’s own good or welfare.

Arguments for (at least some) paternalism
Before delving deeper into arguments for paternalism, I wish to make clear that I will not
consider arguments from a purely consequentialist account. If one adopts a general
consequentialist account, then although autonomy may be included in one’s conception of
happiness or welfare, it is ultimately one’s overall welfare that counts. Thus, on consequentialist
views, an act of paternalism is justified if the resulting benefits to the subject’s welfare outweigh
the harms of overriding her autonomy. As Onora O’Neill writes, “In utilitarian ethical thinking
autonomy is of marginal ethical importance, and paternalism only misplaced when it reflects
miscalculation of benefits” (173). Because according to most consequentialist accounts, there is
only one ultimately value — happiness (or welfare, or some variant thereof) — concern for
autonomy cannot actually conflict with welfare since autonomy is not valued separately from
welfare. In contrast, I assume that autonomy does have value independent of its relation to
welfare and thus the two values may conflict. It is within such a view that I wish to examine the
possibility of overriding autonomy in favor of welfare through paternalistic interferences.

Hypothetical consent
One way of justifying paternalistic interference is through hypothetical consent. Thus,
for example, one may respect autonomy and yet argue that interference is permissible if and only
if a choice is irrational and the subject would consent to the paternalist’s action if she were fully
rational and well informed (Scoccia 318). In taking such a position, Scoccia effectively claims
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that a subject’s autonomy can be overridden if her actual choice does not conform to her ideal,
fully rational choice, where “a choice is rational if it is likely (in light of what the chooser does
or can know at the time he makes it) to maximize (within the bounds permitted by his moral
principles) the satisfaction of his presently held desires” (Scoccia 320). One can interpret this as
Scoccia’s prioritizing the subject’s welfare over her autonomy. In his case, Scoccia appears to
adopt a Desire-Fulfillment theory of welfare, considering his claim that a choice is rational if it is
likely to maximize the satisfaction of the subject’s presently held desires, which may include
having her autonomy respected.6 Scoccia claims that it is justifiable to interfere with impetuous
choices when the subject holds other, stronger desires that conflict with the impetuous choice.
On the other hand, Scoccia argues that this does not necessarily mean that interference with any
impetuous choice is justified, for impetuous choices need not be irrational (321), for example
when the impetuous choice is likely to maximize the satisfaction of the subject’s desires.
Scoccia expands these “desires” to include the subject’s values. Presumably he does so
because although desires can be fleeting and thus more difficult for others to know, values tend
to be more constant and thus it is more likely that others accurately know the subject’s values.
Indeed, Scoccia implies that not only can others know the subject’s values, but they can, to some
extent, know the relative weight of the values based on their own value judgments, allowing
them to make value judgments on behalf of the subject. Accordingly, e.g., Scoccia believes that
one may justifiably interfere with choices based on faulty reasoning such as superstition because
the subject may still have other values that align with those of others who are “more
scientifically enlightened” (322). Even if the subject’s superstitiousness is a stable character
trait, the subject may nevertheless endorse other values that conflict with and potentially override
6

Although Scoccia writes about “presently held” desires, his argument could be expanded to
include past, future, or hypothetical desires.
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her superstitiousness. “The mere fact that superstitiousness is a stable character trait in [the
subject],” Scoccia writes, “gives us no reason at all to think that his values differ from ours. The
mere fact that he continues to prefer laetrile, even after we trot out the proof, also does not show
that he has different values. It may only show that he is impossible to reason with” (Scoccia
322–323). Assuming that the subject’s other values are similar to ours and that those other
values outweigh her superstitiousness, we can presume that she would consent to the
paternalistic interference if she were more rational and well informed.
This may appear to assume a lot, but in certain cases, it does not seem so far-fetched to
assume that the subject’s values are similar to ours, and that, upon rational reflection, the subject
would consent to interference. For example, in the panic of the moment (this will decrease her
voluntariness, as described in more detail later; for now, I set aside the issue of voluntariness),
the subject may resort to superstition without realizing that her actions put her very survival at
risk — yet she probably would, in calmer moments allowing for rational reflection, value
survival more than superstitiousness. That said, Scoccia recognizes that the subject may
explicitly reject interference, in which case paternalistic interferers would need to recognize her
additional value of wanting to act without interference (323) — one might say, her value of
autonomy. Most of us, Scoccia admits, have such a value, and so paternalistic interferences are
not so commonly justifiable as they may at first appear (323). According to Scoccia, “Our strong
desire to run our own lives is quite important for the second view about respect for autonomy
because it is the reason why paternalistic intrusion upon irrational acts — acts which do not
accurately represent the [subject’s] own values — might still involve an imposition of the
intruder’s values on the [subject]” (323).
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I find myself wary of Scoccia’s claims here. First of all, must we explicitly make clear
that we value the ability to run our own lives (i.e. our autonomy), or, perhaps, can we assume
that people have such a value unless they make the opposite explicit? And in any case, even if
people value their autonomy, how do we know how strongly they value it? If they agree with
Kant, then presumably they value their autonomy above all else, and so we can know not to
interfere. In contrast, Mill, although he was a great champion of autonomy, did allow one
exception to his “no paternalistic interference” rule in the case of a subject’s attempting to sell
herself into slavery. Mill argued that interference is permissible in this case in order to “preserve
the liberty of the person to make future choices” (Dworkin, “Paternalism” 118). That is, Mill felt
that it was justifiable to interfere with a subject’s present autonomy in order to protect her future
autonomy. But it is not actually inconsistent for a subject to make an autonomous decision to
forfeit her future autonomy, and perhaps she disagrees with Mill’s value judgment and instead
values her present autonomy more than her future autonomy.
In other words, my biggest worry with Scoccia is that he doesn’t explain how or when we
can know that a subject’s values align with our own and when they don’t, and so the boundaries
of justified paternalism are unclear. However, it may be possible to use Nussbaum’s claim that
empirically, people do have some values, needs, and goods in common to determine certain
cases in which we can expect a subject’s values to align with our own. If we use Nussbaum’s
capabilities theory of welfare to guide us in determining the subject’s values and what would
make her better off, then Scoccia’s argument can be narrowed and reformulated as follows: it is
justifiable to interfere with a subject’s choice when that choice does not maximize her welfare,
which we can at least partially know based on our theory of welfare. The reason why it is
justifiable to interfere with a subject’s choice in such a case is because if the subject were fully
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rational, she would choose the action that would maximize her welfare (namely, the very action
that the paternalist wishes to take), which Scoccia takes to imply hypothetical consent.
However, one must be careful about how one uses Nussbaum’s theory of welfare in this
case. Namely, Nussbaum only defines a limited set of capabilities necessary for welfare.
According to the reformulation of Scoccia’s argument, these are the capabilities that a paternalist
may be justified in securing for a subject even when doing so is contrary to her choice, because
these capabilities represent the values that one can expect to share with the subject. However, if
the subject already has the necessary capabilities for a good life, then the further promotion of
her welfare is based on her own choices, as Nussbaum does recognize that many values are
subjective. Therefore, one could not necessarily refer to one’s own value judgments in order to
determine a subject’s values in areas not regarding her basic capabilities. In such cases, unless
the subject has indicated what her values are, one should respect her autonomous choices
regarding her life. Indeed, respecting her autonomous choices should be in accordance with the
promotion of her welfare.
To give an example in which paternalistic action is justified through hypothetical
consent, consider, for example, the case of a badly injured Jehovah’s Witness who needs a blood
transfusion to survive but refuses treatment on religious grounds. Assume in this case that, in
reaching the decision to refuse a blood transfusion, the Jehovah’s Witness reflects upon and
evaluates the refusal of blood transfusions with regard to her character and concludes that
refusing the blood transfusion is indeed in line with her character. Thus, she is authentic. In
addition, she is self-determining if she then sets out to determine her life in accordance with her
character and judgments — in this case, by refusing the blood transfusion. Being both authentic
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and self-determining, then, the Jehovah’s Witness chooses to refuse the blood transfusion
autonomously.
Without a transfusion, the Jehovah’s Witness will die — thus the question is, can
paternalistic action of giving the subject a blood transfusion, contrary to her autonomous
decision, be justified? Given that one of Nussbaum’s basic capabilities necessary for a good life
is being able to live the length of a normal human lifespan, the subject’s decision to forgo a
blood transfusion is contrary to her welfare, despite her decision. The subject cannot have a
good life without the capability of being able to live the length of a normal human lifespan
(indeed, if she dies she won’t have any of the capabilities necessary to have a good life; she
won’t have a life at all), and by refusing treatment, she gives up the capability to live the length
of a normal human lifespan. Therefore, we know that refusing a blood transfusion will not
improve the subject’s welfare. Moreover, according to Scoccia’s claim, if the subject were fully
rational, she would choose the action that would maximize her welfare, in this case by accepting
the blood transfusion. Because the subject would choose the action that would maximize her
welfare and we know that the ability to live the length of a normal human life is necessary for a
good life, the hypothetical consent of the subject is implied and so paternalistic action to give her
a blood transfusion is justified.
Giving a Jehovah’s Witness a blood transfusion by appealing to her hypothetical consent
despite her actual refusal is problematic, but I argue that the paternalistic action is nevertheless
justified. The action is problematic because, by giving the subject a blood transfusion, we
override her expressed autonomous decision to refuse treatment. However, I agree with Scoccia
that if rational, one would choose the action that would maximize one’s welfare. In general, one
is the best appraiser of one’s welfare — thus, once one’s basic capabilities for a good life are
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fulfilled, one’s welfare is determined by one’s own subjective desires and preferences — but
there are, as Nussbaum argues, some needs and capabilities necessary for a good life that are
shared among us. Where the possession of these capabilities is concerned, we can know a
subject’s welfare. Therefore, because refusing a transfusion denies the Jehovah’s Witness the
capability of living the length of a normal human life7, we know that she cannot have a good life
without a transfusion, and so paternalistic action is justified.
On the other hand, it may be the case that even if the Jehovah’s Witness receives the
blood transfusion, she still won’t have a good life. The possession of the basic capabilities for a
good life is necessary, but not sufficient, to guarantee having a good life. Therefore, it’s possible
that the Jehovah’s Witness will end up miserable on account of having received a blood
transfusion and so her life doesn’t go well even though she survives. The two alternatives in this
case are either a) not giving the subject a blood transfusion, in which case she forgoes the
capability of living the length of a normal human life and thus cannot have a good life or b)
giving the subject a blood transfusion, in which case her life doesn’t go well because she is
miserable and resents the transfusion. She can’t have a good life either way, and so although
interfering paternalistically with her choice to refuse a transfusion may make her miserable, such
interference doesn’t prevent her from having a good life otherwise. However, with a transfusion
perhaps she will have a good life after all, while without one, we know that she won’t.
Therefore, overall she will be better off with the blood transfusion, and so the implication of
hypothetical consent remains and we are justified in acting paternalistically.

7

The exact age that corresponds to “the length of a normal human life” is unclear, although
based on actual averages of human lives Nussbaum probably intends it to be around 70 years old.
In any case, we can specify that the Jehovah’s Witness here is far from that age.
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Importantly, the paternalistic interference is only justified in the case of the Jehovah’s
Witness because we know that refusing the blood transfusion deprives the subject of a capability
necessary for a good life and so hypothetical consent is implied. However, paternalistic
interference isn’t justified in all cases where subjects refuse life-saving medical treatment. In the
case of the Jehovah’s Witness, by refusing medical treatment the subject deprives herself of the
capability of living the length of a normal human life. In contrast, we might consider cases of
elderly people — who have already lived “the length of a normal human life” — who refuse lifesaving treatment. The elderly subject cannot be deprived of the capability of living the length of
a normal human life. When a subject’s capabilities necessary for a good life do not come into
question, her welfare is instead determined by her own desires and preferences. Therefore, if an
elderly subject autonomously refuses life-saving treatment, her decision should — if the decision
is indeed autonomous and has thus been informed by her desires and preferences — reflect her
welfare. Consequently, hypothetical consent is not implied in this case and so paternalistic
interference is unjustified.
Similarly, if the subject has a terminal disease or is otherwise incapable of having good
health (another basic capability for Nussbaum) and chooses to forgo life-saving medical
treatment, then again paternalistic interference seems unjustified. In this case, the subject need
not have lived the length of a normal human life; if her choices are a) to receive treatment and
continue living while incapable of having good health or b) to refuse treatment, then under either
choice, the subject is deprived of a capability necessary for a good life. Either she loses the
capability of living the length of a normal human life if she refuses treatment or she lacks the
capability of having good health due to her terminal disease. Nussbaum does not address welfare
in cases where the subject cannot have all of the capabilities necessary for a good life, but where
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the satisfaction of one basic capability conflicts that of another, it seems that the subject’s
welfare is generally best served by deferring to the subject’s own evaluation of her desires and
preferences. Therefore, in cases where a subject’s basic capabilities cannot all be satisfied, one
should again respect the subject’s autonomous choices rather than interfere paternalistically.

Actual consent
Scoccia bases the justifiability of paternalistic interference on the subject’s hypothetical
consent if she were fully rational and well informed. Yet full rationality and information may
describe individuals only rarely, and therefore such consent may never, in fact, be given.
Instead, Rosemary Carter argues that paternalistic acts are only justified when the subject has
alienated her right to autonomy through consent — and to Carter, this does not necessarily mean
her hypothetical, fully rational consent. However, Carter does admit that in addition to
alienating or forfeiting her right to autonomy through actual prior consent, the subject may
forfeit her right through subsequent consent if, subsequent to the paternalistic interference she
either explicitly does retrospectively consent or she is “disposed to consent either upon request,
or upon the receipt of a relevant piece of information” (136). This subsequent consent must not
be caused by the interference itself. That is, the interferer may not brainwash the subject, distort
her desires, beliefs, or preferences, or withhold relevant information in order to secure the
subject’s subsequent consent (Carter 139).
If the subject gives prior consent, then the act may no longer seem paternalistic, for it is
not in conflict with the subject’s autonomy. However, this is only valid if the consent was given
just prior to the act. If not, the act, while in accordance with the subject’s past autonomy, may in
fact conflict with her present autonomy. Presumably in accepting the subject’s prior consent,
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Carter wishes to protect the subject’s ability to ensure that her future decisions reflect her present
values, but Carter provides no reason why the subject should have this ability.
To provide a more concrete example: perhaps the subject is currently dieting and, worried
that she will break down and gorge herself at a feast later, she decides to give consent to her
friend to prevent her from gorging herself. And yet, when the feast comes along, the subject
authentically reevaluates her desires and preferences with regard to her character and realizes
that no, her earlier desire to diet was not consistent with her character after all and, in fact, she
now desires to enjoy her food more than she desires to diet. She then proceeds to act based upon
this realization, i.e. she is also self-determining. In short, the subject autonomously changes her
mind.
Carter does not seem to consider the dilemma posed here — which should the friend
respect, the subject’s past or present autonomy? Should a subject even be allowed to forfeit her
future autonomy through consent? In a way, forfeiting one’s autonomy through consent is a
restricted case of Mill’s voluntary self-enslavement (where, rather than giving up all autonomy,
the subject merely relinquishes autonomy over a certain domain of her decisions): it is not
inconsistent, perhaps, yet neither should it be respected. If the subject is indeed autonomous at
the feast, then her prior consent should be dismissed and her current autonomy respected instead.
Perhaps in the past, she did indeed forfeit her consent at the time, but part of being autonomous
is the ability to evaluate and change one’s judgments accordingly. Thus, if the subject has since
changed her mind in a way that preserved her autonomy, then her present choices should be
respected over her past ones which have since been rejected8.

8

If, on the other hand, the subject does not authentically reflect upon and evaluate her desire to
eat versus to fast or she doesn’t act according to her authentic judgments, then she does not truly
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As for subsequent consent, this hasn’t actually been given yet, and so it is less clear how
the subject’s autonomy can truly be forfeited at the time of the interference. Carter offers factors
to consider when judging the probability of receiving subsequent consent, such as “whether the
paternalistic action is in accordance with the permanent aims and preferences of the subject”
(139), but again, the subject may change. Of course, if her aims and preferences are actually
permanent, then those would not change, but permanence, although possible, cannot be
guaranteed ahead of time. As Husak points out, “even a reasonable belief that consent will be
given by an agent does not guarantee that his autonomy will not be violated, for autonomy may
allow an agent to choose to do what others could not have reasonably expected” (32). Even in
cases where it seems extremely likely that the subject’s aims and preferences are permanent, the
subject’s autonomous choices now are even more certain because they can be explicitly
communicated. Therefore, it is still preferable to respect the subject’s current autonomous
choices.
Thus, Carter’s conception of consent fails to provide justifiable grounds for paternalistic
interference. However, while it does not seem so justifiable to refuse to respect a subject’s
present decisions on the basis that her autonomy is forfeit through prior or subsequent consent,
one may perhaps interfere on the basis that her present autonomy is compromised. If this is the
case, then the subject is unable to autonomously decide for herself anyway, and so we may be
justified in stepping in to help. This autonomy may be compromised if the subject’s decision is
involuntary or if she is incompetent.

act autonomously when gorging herself. In this case, she does not currently have autonomy to
respect and so her past, autonomous choice should be respected instead.
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Involuntariness
According to Feinberg, “one assumes a risk in a fully voluntary way when one shoulders
it while fully informed of all relevant facts and contingencies, with one’s eyes wide open, so to
speak, in the absence of all coercive pressure. There must be calmness and deliberateness, no
distracting or unsettling emotions, no neurotic compulsion, no misunderstanding” (“Legal...” 7).
Thus, compulsion, misinformation, excitement or impetuousness, clouded judgment, or
immature or defective faculties of reasoning may all diminish the voluntariness of a decision
(Feinberg, “Legal...” 7). Consequently, voluntariness admits of degrees. Feinberg argues that
although Mill wanted to prohibit paternalistic interferences with fully voluntary choices and
probably also with “almost-but-not-quite fully voluntary choices” and even “some substantially
nonvoluntary ones,” he certainly did not hold such qualms about interference with completely
involuntary choices, for “insofar as the choices are not voluntary they are just as alien to the
individual as the choices of someone else” (Feinberg, “Legal...” 8). Respecting a subject’s
involuntary choice does not actually respect her autonomy, for an involuntary choice is not an
autonomous one.
Furthermore, a paternalistic act is justified if it is necessary to determine whether the
subject is acting voluntarily. For example, one would be justified in seizing the subject to
prevent her from crossing an unsafe bridge because, given that most people do not actually want
to cross unsafe bridges, it is safe to assume, at least on a temporary basis, that the subject is
currently acting involuntarily due to misinformation or ignorance (Feinberg, “Legal...” 8).
However, if the subject then verifies that she is, as a matter of fact, aware of the bridge’s
unsafeness, then her action is no longer involuntary and, since her autonomy isn’t compromised
after all — assuming that it isn’t compromised through other factors such as clouded judgment
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— one is no longer justified in interfering (Feinberg, “Legal...” 8). Of course, in this case it
seems possible that the subject’s autonomy is still compromised by, e.g., clouded judgment or
compulsion, and so Feinberg suggests that in such cases, one is justified in gathering proof or
evidence that the subject is truly acting voluntarily before allowing her to cross the unsafe bridge
(“Legal...” 9). This evidence of voluntariness may include “elaborate tests, swearings,
psychiatric testifying, waiting periods, public witnessing, and the like” (Feinberg, “Legal...” 12).
Arneson objects that Feinberg’s definition of “fully voluntary” is too narrow and almost
equivalent to “fully rational,” which, he argues, doesn’t accurately reflect Mill’s thinking after all
(Arneson 484). Instead, Arneson claims that Feinberg seems to commit himself to “the distinctly
un-Millian position that all acts involving mistakes are nonvoluntary and as such fall beyond the
protected scope of the antipaternalism principle” (485). Yet, as stated above, Feinberg explicitly
writes that although Mill probably wanted to prohibit paternalistic interferences with fully
voluntary choices and even some nonvoluntary ones as well, he did not want to prohibit
interferences with completely involuntary choices. Although Feinberg’s suggestion that the
subject provide evidence to “prove” her voluntariness seems to imply that he would like to
ensure that the subject’s action is fairly voluntary, he could lower his standards of proof and
evidence to the point of ensuring that, at the very least, the subject isn’t acting completely
involuntarily. This, Arneson may be willing to agree, is more “Millian.” So, it seems at least
justifiable to interfere in what appear to be completely involuntary decisions until one discovers
otherwise.
However, in addition to paternalistically intervening with completely involuntary
decisions, it seems that paternalistic intervention in decisions that are mostly involuntary should
also be permitted. In order to determine what this means, I propose a somewhat less stringent
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view of voluntariness. Rather than requiring the subject to be “fully informed of all relevant
facts and contingencies,” as Feinberg does, I would like to first consider the relationship between
autonomy and voluntariness. Earlier, I adopted Dworkin’s view of autonomy, according to
which autonomy consists of both authenticity and self-determination, where authenticity refers to
the reflection upon and evaluation of one’s preferences and judgments as well as the ability to
alter these preferences based on one’s evaluations, while self-determination refers to being able
to determine one’s life in accordance with one’s character and judgments. Voluntariness implies
that one is choosing one’s course of action based on one’s considered judgments; thus, it seems
that voluntariness includes self-determination. If one’s actions do not reflect one’s judgments,
then the action is not voluntary and so paternalism is justified. However, voluntariness does not
seem to necessarily imply a strong sense of authenticity. For example, I may form judgments
without a significant amount of reflection, but while acting upon these judgments may be rash
and inadvisable, it’s not necessarily involuntary. Thus, despite the fact that I am generally a
cautious person, I choose on a whim to go bungee-jumping. Although I may not be perfectly
autonomous at this point because I did not sufficiently evaluate my desire to go bungee-jumping
and indeed it is contrary to my character, I may nevertheless be perfectly aware of what I am
choosing to do and am acting voluntarily.
Secondly, I believe that voluntariness implies a sense of what someone “wants,” meaning
that the subject’s desires also come into play when determining the extent of her voluntariness.
Perhaps, then, we should also appeal to the subject’s strongest desires, as we did in PreferenceHedonism. Consider again the case of the subject crossing the bridge. Perhaps she does
presently desire to cross the unsafe bridge, but another desire, e.g. a hypothetical desire to safely
reach the other side or a future desire to do something which would be impossible were she to
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severely injure herself or die in the present, might be stronger than her present desire. If the
subject has other, stronger desires than the one presently compelling her to cross the bridge, it
doesn’t seem that she really “wants” to cross this bridge, all things considered. Therefore, even
if she is presently self-determining, this is a case in which I would deem the subject mostly
involuntary, and consequently paternalism is appropriate here. On the other hand, if the subject
has other desires that conflict with her current one but which are weaker, then the subject is,
despite these reservations, mostly voluntary, and so paternalism is not necessarily justified.

Incompetence
A second way in which autonomy may be compromised is through incompetence.
Competency, according to Christman, “includes various capacities for rational thought, selfcontrol, and freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception, and so on.” Carter
argues that a subject’s action rights (meaning the rights to do or refrain from doing something,
such as walking down the street at night) are compromised if she lacks the relevant capacities
(such as the capacity to appreciate the consequences of the proposed actions) (143). Therefore,
in cases of incompetence, there is no need to respect the subject’s right to act upon her decisions
because her rights are compromised anyway.
However, defining cases of incompetence is no easy task. Typically, one is considered
“competent” based on a threshold standard. That is, is one is “competentt,” as Brock puts it, if
one meets a certain threshold for competence, and one is incompetent if one fails to meet that
threshold (Brock, “Paternalism and Promoting...” 241). Using this conception of competence,
we can justify the view that it is acceptable for normal persons to act paternalistically toward the
mildly retarded, who are considered incompetentt, while it is unacceptable for the gifted or very
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intelligent to act paternalistically toward normal persons, who are considered competentt (Brock,
“Paternalism and Promoting...” 241 – 242).
But how do we set the threshold for competence? Carter considers the class of
incompetents to be “those who are unable to understand or practice satisfactorily the basic
requirements of survival, and so whose lives would be at worst in constant peril, and at best
grossly unhappy, if it were not for intervention on the part of others” (143). Based on this
definition, it seems that Carter’s threshold for competence is the ability to survive. And indeed,
we probably do want to interfere with the decisions of subjects that are unable to even survive
without help. Maybe this is all the interference we wish to justify. But maybe we would rather
not set the threshold for competence quite so low, in which case we returned to the dilemma of
setting an appropriate and non-arbitrary threshold for competence.

Conclusion
Of the justifications for paternalism considered here, only Scoccia’s hypothetical consent
seems to justify paternalism in cases where the subject’s autonomy is not currently
compromised. By appealing to the subject’s hypothetical consent, we may override the subject’s
autonomous decision if we know what will make the subject better off. Yet because the
subject’s welfare is in large part dependent on her own desires, our knowledge of the subject’s
welfare is limited. Accordingly, I refer to Nussbaum’s capabilities theory of welfare to argue
that at least in cases where the subject’s autonomous decision will deprive her of basic
capabilities necessary for a good life or will keep her in a position lacking such capabilities,
interference with a subject’s action that gives her these capabilities will promote her welfare.
Thus, for example, we are justified in overriding a Jehovah’s Witness’s autonomous refusal to
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receive a life-saving blood transfusion because such a refusal would deprive the Jehovah’s
Witness of the capability of living the length of a normal human life. On the other hand, if the
subject already has the basic capabilities necessary for a good life, or if it is impossible for her to
have all of these capabilities (e.g. if, regardless of how she chooses, she will either lack the
capability of living the length of a normal human life or of having good health), then we no
longer have clear knowledge of how to promote the subject’s welfare. Without such knowledge,
we cannot rely on the subject’s hypothetical consent, and so paternalistic interference is not
justified.
Where appealing to hypothetical consent is not possible, other arguments for paternalism
fail to provide justification for paternalism when the subject’s autonomy is intact. If the
subject’s autonomy is currently intact, Carter’s arguments for justifying paternalistic interference
through prior or subsequent consent are unconvincing because it is unclear why we should
respect a subject’s prior or subsequent consent if she is now autonomous as well. On the other
hand, if a subject’s prior or subsequent consent is given and her autonomy is currently
compromised, then the issue of respecting her current autonomy doesn’t come into play because
there is no current autonomy to respect. However, in cases where the subject’s autonomy is
compromised, the paternalistic interference is justified more on account of the subject’s
autonomy being compromised, such as through involuntariness or incompetence, than on
account of the subject’s prior or subsequent consent.
So ultimately, there are only a very limited number of cases in which paternalistic
interference is justified in overriding an autonomous subject’s decision. This may be frustrating
for those who wish to aid an autonomous subject that seems to be making a terrible decision, but
this is the price we pay for respecting autonomy. And indeed, we ourselves would generally
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wish our own autonomy to be respected as well. To determine, intuitively, just how important
one’s autonomy is to oneself, Feinberg suggests putting oneself in the shoes of the subject
(Harm... 62). The subject’s autonomous decisions, presumably, are based on the belief that they
reflect her interests or, at the very least, aren’t bad for her (if she did genuinely believe she was
making a terrible decision, Feinberg claims that “that would be so irrational that it would put the
voluntariness of [her] choice in doubt”). “If [s]he chose that alternative because [s]he believed it
good (or at least not bad) for [her]self,” Feinberg continues, “then either the difference between
[her] and [her] would-be constrainers is over some matter of fact about which [s]he is simply
mistaken, in which case [s]he would welcome being set right, or it is about the nature of [her]
self-interest, or the reasonableness, given [her] values, of the risks [s]he wishes to assume”
(Harm... 62). If the difference concerns the nature of her self-interests or the reasonableness of
the risks she wishes to assume, the “disagreement would be more intractable,” and the subject
would resent having her autonomous decision overruled in favor of others values (Feinberg,
Harm... 62). After all, it is her interests, her risks — and thus, more than anyone else, she should
have ultimate say in her decision.

53

Works Cited
Arneson, Richard J. “Mill versus Paternalism.” Ethics. 90.4 (1980): 470-489. Print.
Brock, Dan. “Paternalism and Promoting the Good.” Paternalism. Ed. Rolf Sartorius. 1st ed.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 237-260. Print.
Carter, Rosemary. “Justifying Paternalism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. VII.1 (1977): 133145. Print.
Christman, John. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, 2010. Web. 19 Dec 2011.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/>.
Dworkin, Gerald. “Paternalism.” Morality and the Law. Ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom. 1st ed.
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971. 107-26. Print.
Dworkin, Gerald. “Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts.” Paternalism. Ed. Rolf Sartorius. 1st
ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 105-112. Print.
Dworkin, Gerald. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. 1st ed. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988. Print.
Feinberg, Joel. “Legal Paternalism.” Paternalism. Ed. Rolf Sartorius. 1st ed. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 3-18. Print.
Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Self. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Print.
Herzog, Don. Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory. 1st ed. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1989. Print.
Husak, Douglas N. “Paternalism and Autonomy.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. 10.1 (1981): 2746. Print.

54

Nussbaum, Martha C., and Jonathan Glover. "Women, Culture, and Development." Oxford
Scholarship Online. (2003): 61-104. Print.
O'Neill, Onora. "Paternalism and Partial Autonomy." Journal of Medical Ethics. 10.4 (1984):
173-178. Print.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. 1st ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Print.
Scoccia, Danny. "Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy." Ethics. 100.2 (1990): 318-334. Print.
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. "Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation."
Philosophy & Public Affairs. 29.3 (2000): 205-250. Print.
Sunstein, Cass R. "Preferences and Politics." Philosophy & Public Affairs. 20.1 (1991): 3-34.
Print.

55

